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AGAINST LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
 
JUDITH LICHTENBERG*  
 
ABSTRACT 
We have many good reasons to abolish life without parole sentences 
(LWOP, known in some countries as whole life sentences) and no good 
reasons not to. After reviewing the current state of LWOP sentences in the 
United States, I argue that the only rationale for punishment that can hope 
to justify them is retributivism. But even if retributivism is a sound 
principle, it in no way entails life without parole. One reason is that unless 
one believes, like Kant, that appropriate punishments must be carried out 
whatever the circumstances, we must acknowledge that other 
considerations are relevant to determining punishments. Furthermore, 
retributivism does not dictate particular punishments, and so the question 
remains which are reasonable and appropriate.   
Even retributivists, then, can reject life without parole. But showing 
why it’s wrong requires a positive case for abolition as well. I offer 
several reasons. First, shortening and tempering sentences need not 
trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, as some suggest, 
because the expressive meaning of sentences is malleable. Second, most if 
not all people are not fully culpable for their criminal acts, and we should 
mitigate their punishment accordingly. Third, abolishing life without 
parole—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to bring many benefits: to 
prisoners, their loved ones, the community in general, and to those who 
decide for abolition and who carry it out. Among these is the promotion of 
certain attitudes it is good for people to have—what, following Ryan 
Preston-Roedder, I call faith in humanity. Finally, there’s a certain 
pointlessness in continuing to punish a person who has undergone 
changes of character that distance him greatly from the person who 
committed the crime many decades earlier. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Until about a decade ago, vocal criticism of sentences in the 
American criminal justice system focused mainly on the death penalty. 
The U.S. stood out, and still does, as nearly the only developed country in 
the world with capital punishment, and for this it has been subject to sharp 
criticism both internally and internationally. The death penalty is still a 
target of criticism, but it may well be on its way out. In addition to the 
view that it is inherently wrong or barbaric—or, if not inherently wrong, 
then wrong or barbaric in an advanced society like the United States—
there are at least three familiar objections. One is the death penalty’s 
enormous costs compared to even a sentence of life imprisonment—a 
seemingly counterintuitive fact resulting from the very high legal expenses 
associated with the lengthy and mandatory appeals process in death 
penalty cases.1 Another has to do with the glaring racial and 
socioeconomic disparities in how the death penalty is and has been 
applied.2 Finally, there is the increasing difficulty of carrying out 
executions humanely, as pharmaceutical companies that provide the drugs 
for the most commonly used method, lethal injection, have become wary 
of ethical missteps or bad publicity.3 For these and perhaps other reasons, 
both executions and support for the death penalty fell in 2016 to levels 
lower than they had been in decades.4 
 If the death penalty disappears, and even if it doesn’t, the time has 
come to closely examine other harsh punishments in use in our system. 
Here I consider what is generally considered the next harshest punishment: 
life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).5 
In section I, I explain why the time is ripe to evaluate the legitimacy of 
life sentences. Section II explores the relationship between LWOP and the 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
 2. The racial disparities are well-documented. See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in 
Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 
(1998), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-black-and-white-who-lives-who-dies-who 
decides#Executive%20Summary. For socioeconomic disparities and their consequences for the quality 
of lawyering in death penalty cases, see, e.g., Stephen Bright, “Imposition of the Death Penalty upon 
the Poor, Racial Minorities, the Intellectually Disabled and the Mentally Ill,” 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/SBrightUN2014.pdf. 
 3. On the pharmaceutical issues see, e.g., the inaugural episode, “Cruel and Unusual,” of the 
NPR podcast series More Perfect. See More Perfect: Cruel and Unusual, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(June 2, 2016), https://www.npr.org/podcasts/481105292/more-perfect.    
         4.   Richard Perez-Pena, Executions Hit 25-Year-Low and Support Is Falling, Report Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/us/death-penalty-capital-
punishment.html?_r=0; see also The Death Penalty in 2016: Year-End Report, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, (2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd2016.  
         5.   I say “generally considered” because some view life without parole as just as harsh or even 
harsher than the death penalty; more on this subject below. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
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death penalty, which helps to explain why LWOP has received insufficient 
scrutiny. In section III, I examine the main arguments for punishment and 
conclude that only retribution can plausibly ground LWOP. In sections IV 
and V, I examine various understandings of retributivism and conclude 
that no plausible interpretation entails or even necessarily recommends 
LWOP. Section VI offers three positive arguments for the abolition of 
LWOP. Section VII summarizes my conclusions. 
 
I.  WHY WE SHOULD REEXAMINE THE LEGITIMACY OF LIFE-WITHOUT-
PAROLE SENTENCES 
Close examination of life-without-parole sentences is overdue for a 
variety of reasons, familiar to many who study these issues but 
nonetheless worth reviewing.  
 
A. Explosion of LWOP Sentences 
 
  One reason is the explosion of these sentences in the last few decades. 
As of 2012, 49,080 people were serving LWOP sentences.6 Between 2008 
and 2012, LWOP sentences increased by 22.1%; they have quadrupled 
since 1984.7 In six states and the federal system all life sentences are 
LWOP.8 In 2012, over 3200 people were serving LWOP sentences for 
nonviolent drug and property offenses.9 Meanwhile, from 1984 to 2012, 
the U.S. population increased only 33%, from about 236 to 314 million.10 
 
  
 
 
         6.   ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE 
SENTENCES IN AMERICA (2013), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/life-goes-on-the-
historic-rise-in-life-sentences-in-america/. These sentences are sometimes called “natural life 
sentences”; in the UK they go by the name “whole life sentences.” 
 7. Id. at 13. 
 8. ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING 
USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 9 (2009), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/no-
exit-the-expanding-use-of-life-sentences-in-america/. 
 9. Truth About Life Without Parole: Condemned to Die in Prison, ACLU NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA, https://www.aclunc.org/article/truth-about-life-without-parole-condemned-die-prison 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
       10.   See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES:  JULY 1, 1900 
TO JULY 1, 1999 (June 28, 2000), https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/1900-
1980/national/totals/popclockest.txt; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACS DEMOGRAPHIC AND HOUSING 
ESTIMATES, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/results/tables?q=Population%20Change%20and%20Components&t=Po
pulation%20Change%20and%20Components&tab=ACSDP1Y2016.DP05&ps=search*suggestions@f
alse$app*from@RESULTS_ALL$table*currentPage@1. 
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B. Explosion of Life-with-parole Sentences 
 
Life sentences—with the possibility of parole—have also quadrupled 
since 1984. As of 2009, almost 100,000 people were serving life sentences 
with parole.11 (Those serving life sentences, with or without parole, 
constitute 9.5% of all prisoners.) “In eight jurisdictions for which data are 
available since the 1980s, average time served by lifers with murder 
convictions nearly doubled from 11.6 years for those paroled in the 1980s 
to 23.2 years for those paroled between 2000 and 2013.”12 
In twenty-six states, parole boards—often operating behind closed 
doors—have almost unlimited power to make decisions, and these 
decisions are largely unreviewable.13 The average state parole board 
considers 8355 inmates for release a year—thirty-five decisions a day—
and has other responsibilities. In forty-four states, the board is wholly 
appointed by the governor; these remunerative positions can be rewards 
for former aides and allies.14 
Lifers in Tennessee must serve fifty-one years before they become 
eligible for parole.15 In California, the parole board recommends parole 
two to five percent of the time; its recommendations are often rejected by 
the governor’s office.16 In Maryland, almost ten percent of prisoners are 
serving life sentences with parole; not a single one was released between 
1996 and 2014.17 Releasing prisoners is politically risky, as we saw in the 
1988 presidential election when it emerged that Democratic candidate 
Michael Dukakis had released convicted felon “Willie” Horton on a 
weekend furlough program. Horton did not return to prison and was later 
convicted of violent crimes, including rape, committed after his escape.  
  
 
 
 11. Nellis & King, supra note 8, at 3, 6.  
 12. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Delaying a Second Chance: the Declining Prospects for Parole on Life 
Sentences, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Jan. 31, 2017), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/delaying-second-chance-declining-prospects-parole-
life-sentences/#II.%20Key%20Findings. 
 13. Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/10/life-without-parole. 
 14. Id. at 8, 4. 
 15. Jessica S. Henry, Death-in-Prison Sentences: Overutilized and Underscrutinized, in 
CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. & AUSTIN SARAT, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH 
PENALTY? 69 (2012). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Ghandnoosh, supra note 12, at 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
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Some attribute Dukakis’s defeat in the election to the Horton ad run by the 
George H.W. Bush campaign.18 
In short, life with parole is often de facto life without parole.  
C. Supreme Court Restrictions on Severe Sentences, Especially for 
Juveniles 
At the same time, for the last decade or so the Supreme Court has been 
imposing restrictions on the death penalty and on life-without-parole 
sentences, at least for juveniles. In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons,19 the Court 
struck down the death penalty for juveniles. Later, in 2010, in Graham v. 
Florida,20 the Court invalidated LWOP for juveniles not convicted of 
homicide. And in 2012, in a joint ruling deciding Miller v. Alabama and 
Jackson v. Hobbs, the Court announced that mandatory LWOP sentences 
for juveniles are unconstitutional.21 This ruling alone affected 2500 
prisoners—not surprising when we consider that adolescence is prime time 
for criminal activity.22  
 
D. Comparison with Other Countries 
 
Another reason to reevaluate LWOP policies is the enormous disparity 
in sentencing practices between the United States and other developed 
countries. Norway is best known—in some circles notorious—for capping 
the maximum sentence for any crime at twenty-one years. That includes 
the case of Anders Breivik, convicted for the murder of sixty-nine young 
people and eight others at a Workers’ Youth League summer camp in 
2011.23  
 
 
 18. For a good account and a recent interview with Horton see Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, 
Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited - .LQhugD6MV. As Dukakis 
puts it in an interview reported in this article, “[t]he easy thing to do is never to commute anybody, 
never parole anybody. And unfortunately, in my judgment, that’s happening more and more.” Id. 
       19.   Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 20. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 21. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 22. See Joshua Ravner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
(July 1, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole/. The Roper 
decision affected 72 prisoners, the Graham decision, 123. 
       23.   That does not mean Breivik will be freed after twenty-one years. “Judges will be able to 
sentence him to an unlimited number of five-year extensions if he is still deemed a risk to the public.” 
Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 20, 2015),  
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime - .jVkAeF0cA. Recently 
Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project recommended a twenty-year maximum on federal criminal 
sentences. Marc Mauer, A Proposal to Reduce Time Served in Federal Prison, Testimony to Charles 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Germany outlawed LWOP in 1977. The Federal Constitutional Court 
argued that “rehabilitation is constitutionally required in any community 
that establishes human dignity as its centerpiece”—which the German 
constitution does.24 Thus, “a humane enforcement of life imprisonment is 
possible only when the prisoner is given a concrete and realistically 
attainable chance to regain his freedom . . . . ”25  In 2013, the European 
Court of Human Rights decided that LWOP violated Article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits “inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”26   
These disparities do not show that the Europeans are right and the 
Americans wrong. But they are enough to make a reflective person think 
about the meanings, purposes, and limits of criminal punishment. 
II. LWOP AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
LWOP invites scrutiny in part because of its intimate relationship with 
the death penalty. It’s almost impossible to think through the former 
without making comparisons with the latter. “Life without parole has been 
absolutely crucial to whatever progress has been made against the death 
penalty," according to James Liebman, Columbia law professor and 
scholar of the death penalty. “The drop in death sentences”—from 320 in 
 
 
Colson Task Force on Federal Corrections, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Mar. 11, 2015), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/a-proposal-to-reduce-time-served-in-federal-prison/. 
 24. Life Imprisonment Case (1977), 45 BVerGE 187 in THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 366 (Donald P. Kommers ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1997). 
       25.   Id. at 308–09. Article 1.1 of the German constitution (the "Basic Law") states that “human 
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” Article 2.1 
states: “[e]very person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not 
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.” Id. 
 26. Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III-Eur. Ct. H.R 317.  
[I]n the context of a life sentence, Article 3 must be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the 
sentence, in the sense of a review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether 
any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress toward rehabilitation has 
been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be 
justified on legitimate penological grounds. 
Id. (citing the Grand Chamber’s Judgment at §119). On January 17, 2017, however, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) announced that the whole life sentence of 
a UK prisoner, brought before the ECtHR in Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, 2017-Eur. Ct. H.R 65, 
does not violate Article 3—thereby reversing a previous ruling. Id. The change comes from the finding 
that the UK law complies with the ECHR standards on release and review. “Specifically, U.K. law 
allows the Secretary of State to reduce a life sentence at any time on compassionate grounds, which, 
the State claims, encompass more than end-of-life situations and will be interpreted in line with the 
ECHR.” ECtHR: UK ‘Whole Life Sentences’ Now Compatible with ECHR, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2017/01/23/ecthr-u-k-whole-life-sentences-now-compatible-with-
echr/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+InternationalJusticeR
esourceCenter+%28International+Justice+Resource+Center%29). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
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1996 to 125 in 2005—“would not have happened without LWOP.”27  Why 
the connection? Death penalty opponents point to studies showing that 
support for it drops drastically among jurors and the general public when 
LWOP is an option.28 It stands to reason that people who fear that 
abolishing the death penalty means letting dangerous criminals go free, or 
dispensing less punishment than they deserve, may be reassured by life-
without-parole sentences. Death penalty abolitionists have sometimes even 
joined with “pro-incarceration activists and legislators” to pass LWOP 
statutes.29 From 1992 to 2003, the LWOP population grew more than five 
times faster than the group of prisoners on death row: the former by 170%, 
the latter by 31%.30 
 Ironically, prisoners sentenced to LWOP are legally disadvantaged 
compared to those sentenced to death, who have rights of appeal and 
review noncapital defendants do not get.31 As New York Times reporter 
Adam Liptak puts it, “[t]he pro bono lawyers who work so aggressively to 
exonerate or spare the lives of death row inmates are not interested in the 
cases of people merely serving life terms.”32 Courts could not extend these 
kinds of protections to those serving LWOP sentences without incurring 
staggering costs.33  
One might mistakenly infer from the disparity in treatment that LWOP 
is not so bad. But a different conclusion is that some have put “the death 
penalty” into a box that says “forbidden”—perhaps on deep-seated 
religious grounds that prohibit killing, even though as a matter of fact few 
people regard the taking of life as in all cases impermissible. The 
consequence has been to treat all non-corporal punishments as in a wholly 
different category, automatically legitimate or at the very least not 
forbidden. But the deep justifications for abolition of the death penalty 
have implications for other punishments, including life without parole. 
 
 
 
 27. Adam Liptak, No Way Out: Serving Life, With No Chance of Redemption, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
5, 2005), (quoting James Lieberman), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/05/us/serving-life-with-no-chance-of-redemption.html?_r=0. 
 28. Id.; see also OGLETREE & SARAT, supra note 15, at 5. 
 29. Note, A Matter of Life and Death: the Effect of Life-without-Parole Statutes on Capital 
Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1839 (2006). 
 30. Id. at 1852. 
 31. “Unlike death sentences . . . life-without-parole sentences receive no special consideration 
from appellate tribunals.” Id. at 1853. 
 32. Liptak, supra note 27. 
 33. Rachel E. Barkow, Life Without Parole and the Hope for Real Sentencing Reform, in 
OGLETREE & SARAT, supra note 15, at 207. Barkow provides a good analysis of the comparison 
between LWOP and the death penalty. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. LWOP AND THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT 
For all these reasons, then, it’s appropriate to look closely at LWOP 
and the justifications offered for it. It’s important first to clarify the scope 
of this argument. Some LWOP sentences are excessive by any reasonable 
standard—including at least those imposed for nonviolent offenses. 
Without settling on what that standard is, I assume many people who do 
not in principle oppose LWOP would agree. Since the case presented here 
against LWOP is an argument of principle, we may exclude from 
consideration those many incarcerated people who are subject to obviously 
excessive sentences. 
A second group of those serving LWOP sentences should never be 
released. There are two possible reasons that might be given for 
continuing to incarcerate them. One is that they are too dangerous; the 
other is that they are unrepentant.34 I address these reasons in more detail 
below. But requiring someone to remain incarcerated for their whole life is 
not the same as sentencing them at the time of conviction to LWOP. To 
oppose LWOP in principle is to oppose sentencing a person at the time of 
conviction to life in prison without the possibility of parole—it is to 
oppose making a final judgment at sentencing that no matter what a person 
does, no matter how he changes, he will never be fit to rejoin society. It is 
not to say that every person sentenced for a crime must eventually be 
released. 
The traditional literature generally divides the justifications for 
punishment into several kinds: general deterrence, specific deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. Philosophers and criminal 
justice theorists in recent years have offered other aims of punishment that 
do not fit neatly into these categories but sometimes overlap with them, 
such as moral education, communication, and the expression of moral 
norms and values.35 In what follows, I consider the standard justifications 
and indicate where and how the latter ones fit with them. 
The aim of general deterrence is to punish individuals who have 
 
 
 34. Many people too dangerous to be released may suffer from mental illness and belong not in 
prison but in a facility where punishment per se is not the aim. Conditions in the latter can be awful 
too, of course—and people incarcerated in such facilities may sometimes even prefer prison, where 
their sentences may have an end point. An unforgettable illustration occurs in Frederick Wiseman’s 
1967 documentary, Titicut Follies, about patient-inmates in a Massachusetts hospital for the criminally 
insane. One of the men incarcerated there begs to be transferred to prison, which his custodians take as 
further evidence of his lack of mental competence. 
       35.   See also 18 U.S.C. § 1853 (2012). According to the statutory provision, the sentence should 
“reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the 
offense; afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment in the most effective manner” Id. (numbers and sections omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
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committed crimes in order to send a message to others who might be 
contemplating criminal acts that they too will suffer punishment if they 
carry out their plans. Few would deny that general deterrence must and 
does play some part in the legitimate rationales for punishment. If no 
penalties attached to criminal behavior, it is safe to assume more people 
would commit crimes. This claim is perfectly compatible with the view 
that people refrain from committing crimes for other reasons besides the 
prospect of punishment. The question is which deterrents function to 
reduce the likelihood of committing crimes, and by how much.  
One finding is that for some kinds of crimes—especially drug 
trafficking—those sent to prison are quickly replaced by others.36 More 
important, much recent work shows that it is the certainty of punishment 
rather than its severity that deters would-be criminals. There are at least 
three reasons why severe punishments are less effective than abstract 
consideration might lead one to expect. First, not all potential offenders 
are deterrable; certainly some are less deterrable than others. No one is 
purely rational  (whatever that means); substance abuse and mental illness 
make would-be offenders less so. It’s clear that many people fail to 
perform cost-benefit calculations before breaking the law, or do so poorly. 
Second, to be deterred by a punishment, one has to know what the 
punishment is; people tend to underestimate the severity of penalties. 
Perhaps most important is that the many steps between crime and 
punishment—being caught, accused, tried, convicted, and sentenced—
greatly reduce the likelihood of punishment. As Valerie Wright puts it in a 
report for the Sentencing Project, “since most crimes, including serious 
ones, do not result in an arrest and conviction, the overall deterrent effect 
of the certainty of punishment is substantially reduced.”37 For all these 
reasons, it is extremely unlikely that LWOP deters crime better than 
shorter sentences. 
What about specific deterrence? This term is sometimes used 
ambiguously. Most literally, it refers to the idea that the negative 
experience of incarceration will serve as an incentive for an offender not to 
engage in criminal activity again. But specific deterrence may be conflated 
with incapacitation: while people are locked up, they are less likely to 
 
 
 36. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 176, 181–83 
(2013). 
 37. VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT (Nov. 2010), available at  
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/deterrence-in-criminal-justice-evaluating-certainty-vs-
severity-of-punishment/. This report is also the source of other claims in this paragraph. See also 
Tonry, supra note 36, for a thorough review of the literature pointing to the ineffectiveness of severe 
penalties as general deterrents. 
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 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
 
 
48 
engage in antisocial or destructive behavior. By incarcerating offenders, 
we decrease the chances that they will harm others—not entirely, of 
course, since they may harm fellow prisoners or prison employees, but 
largely.38  
However, neither of these purposes is served by LWOP sentences. The 
most important reason is that almost all criminals, including violent ones, 
age out of crime before middle age.”39 As an extensive study by the 
National Research Council concluded in 2014:  
[B]ecause recidivism rates decline markedly with age and prisoners 
necessarily age as they serve their prison sentence, lengthy prison 
sentences are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by 
incapacitation unless they are specifically targeted at very high-rate 
or extremely dangerous offenders.40  
In addition, one study shows that those released from life sentences 
were “less than one-third as likely as all released offenders to be rearrested 
within three years of release from prison.”41 The reason for this seemingly 
paradoxical fact may be at least partly that those released had already 
served long sentences and were no longer young. In any case, from the 
point of view of both specific deterrence and incapacitation, LWOP 
sentences make little sense. 
Consider now rehabilitation.42 The concept of rehabilitation is also 
ambiguous. Does it mean simply becoming a person who can live in 
society without creating a risk of injury to others? Or does it include some 
 
 
 38. Some may think that since prisoners have done wrong and have forfeited some of their rights, 
the risks they bear of harm by other incarcerated persons should trouble us less than risks borne by 
those on the outside. 
 39. Goldstein, supra note 23; see also JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 193, 231 (2017). 
       40.   NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 155–56 (2014), http://doi.org/10.17226/18613. Citing a 
study by Alfred Blumstein and colleagues, an article for the Marshall Project argues that “for the eight 
serious crimes closely tracked by the F.B.I.—murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny-theft, arson, and car theft—five to 10 years is the typical duration that adults commit these 
crimes, as measured by arrests.” Dana Goldstein, supra note 23; see also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, 
JACQUELINE COHEN, & PAUL HSIEH, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DURATION OF ADULT 
CRIMINAL CAREERS: FINAL REPORT 12–22 (1982); Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington & Alfred 
Blumstein, The Criminal Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUST. 359, 445–51 (2003). 
       41.   MARC MAUER, RYAN S. KING & MALCOLM C. YOUNG, THE MEANING OF “LIFE”: LONG 
PRISON SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 24 (2004), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-
meaning-of-life-long-prison-sentences-in-context/. 
 42. Here I leave aside that, despite its appearance in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 of the criminal code, 
rehabilitation has not been an explicit aim of the U.S. criminal justice system at least since Congress 
passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which proclaimed that “imprisonment is not an 
appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 and 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, U.S. House of Representatives, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/senate-bill/1762; see also supra note 35. 
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notion of repentance or change of heart? I shall return to these questions, 
but for present purposes it doesn’t matter, except in the sense that the 
stronger meaning of rehabilitation encompasses moral education, 
sometimes offered as a distinct justification for punishment.  
Some prisoners no doubt become rehabilitated over years of 
incarceration, although it may be hard to distinguish rehabilitation from 
the usual process of aging out of crime. On the other hand, there is good 
reason to believe that prison sometimes makes people worse rather than 
better.43 Leaving these factors aside, it is hard to see how rehabilitation 
could be a purpose of life-without-parole sentences, if, as seems clear, 
LWOP is neither necessary nor useful in realizing that purpose. On the 
contrary, it seems more likely that the prospect of eventual freedom would 
serve as an incentive for an incarcerated person to change.44 
What about punishment’s expressive function? Punishment expresses 
condemnation of wrongful acts, respect for victims, and commitment to 
the rule of law.45 To perform these functions adequately—to take crime 
seriously and to repair the social and moral fabric damaged by it—requires 
not just any punishments but ones that “fit” the crimes.  
An important question is whether or to what extent the fit and 
proportionality of punishments are objectively given; or, conversely, to 
what extent they are culturally relative or socially determined. Would a 
twenty-one-year sentence for the unrepentant Dylann Roof, who killed 
nine parishioners at Mother Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church 
in Charleston, South Carolina in June 2015, express disrespect for his 
victims and the rule of law? This is the kind of sentence Roof would get in 
Norway. It would be surprising if Norwegians did not value life to the 
same degree that Americans do, and thus that their shorter sentences 
express or represent a disrespect of humanity.46 This also seems consistent 
with the idea that cultural variations in how norms are expressed are 
compatible with an objectivist view of their significance. For example, 
 
 
 43. See, e.g., Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor-Market Impacts of Incarceration 
(Nov. 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia University Department of 
Economics). 
 44. See, e.g., Dan Bernhardt, Steve Mongrain, & Joann Roberts, Rehabilitated or Not: An 
Informational Theory of Parole Decisions, 28 J. LAW & ECON. ORG. 186 (2012), arguing that 
rehabilitation correlates with sentences that are neither too short nor too long. Presumably LWOP 
sentences are too long. See section VI for discussion of how policies and expectations toward 
offenders can influence their behavior. 
       45.   These functions might be thought separate and supportive of somewhat different rationales 
for punishment. I collect them together, and think together they fulfill the expressive function. The 
expressive function is sometimes understood to be a version of retributivism, although one might also 
view it as a close cousin of general deterrence. In general, the distinctions between the various 
justifications for punishments are less clear than they are often made out to be. 
 46. See supra section I.D. 
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every culture has norms of civility and rudeness, but what constitutes 
civility and rudeness differs from place to place. In some places, it is said, 
belching is good manners; not here.   
This example might be thought to tell against my point, not for it. 
Maybe shorter sentences do not express disrespect for victims and the law 
in Norway, it might be argued; but given American habits and customs, in 
the U.S. they would. But this claim wrongly suggests that cultural 
practices and customs are immutable. Changes in attitude do not happen 
overnight. No doubt reforms need to occur gradually, not too far ahead of 
public sentiment and partly spurred by it. That is likely to be the way 
sentencing practices would evolve in any case, just as they have with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s erosion of the death penalty and LWOP sentences 
for juveniles.  
The concept of a reasonable and appropriate minimum sentence is not 
completely malleable. A hundred-dollar fine for rape is too little; a twenty-
year prison sentence for shoplifting is too much. But the concept is 
flexible enough to accommodate the abolition of LWOP without 
expressing disrespect for victims or the rule of law. 
IV. RETRIBUTIVISM AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE GROUND FOR LWOP 
I have argued that LWOP sentences cannot be justified in terms of 
general deterrence, specific deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, or 
expressivism. That leaves retributivism as the ground on which their 
legitimacy must rest. Can this defense succeed? To decide will require an 
extended discussion. 
Here is a simple formulation of the retributivist argument for LWOP: 
1. Some people’s crimes are sufficiently heinous that they deserve 
LWOP. 
2. People ought to get the punishment they deserve.  
The traditional and perhaps intuitive understanding of retributivism is 
lex talionis: the law of retaliation, “an eye for an eye.” It’s not difficult to 
show that this interpretation is morally unacceptable, for well-known 
reasons: it would allow or even require torturing torturers and raping 
rapists, among other things.47 The alternative to lex talionis I will consider 
has been described as proportional retributivism: the idea that we should 
punish people in proportion to their crimes.48 On this view, we should 
construct an ordinal ranking of crimes and punishments in which the worst 
crimes get the worst punishments; the next worst crimes get the next worst 
 
 
       47.   See Jeffrey Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 
130, 119–21 (1985). 
 48. Id. at 120. 
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punishments, etc. Of course, this is at best an ideal that can be achieved 
only roughly. And, as I have just argued, the ranking should not be purely 
ordinal. If the worst punishment is too light, it will not take seriously the 
crimes it addresses.  
The concept of proportional retributivism leaves open at least two 
important questions. First, what is the range—from minimum to 
maximum—of morally acceptable and appropriate punishments? Much of 
the rest of this article aims to show that LWOP lies beyond the maximum. 
Second, what is the deontic force of “ought” in “We ought to punish 
people in proportion to their crimes”? Retributivism is not satisfied, I 
believe, by the minimal view that a certain punishment is permitted—i.e., 
that guilt is a necessary condition for punishment.49 To say a person 
deserves punishment x is at least to recommend that the person suffer x. 
But this still leaves much room for variation. Here are three possible 
interpretations:  
(i) A should be punished, other things being equal.  
(ii) A should be punished unless some important countervailing reasons 
apply.  
(iii) A should be punished no matter what.  
Kant notably believed (iii). On his view, punishing wrongdoers is 
morally required:  
[W]hoever has committed murder, must die. There is, in this case, 
no juridical substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the 
satisfaction of justice. There is no likeness or proportion between 
life, however painful, and death . . . . Even if a civil society resolved 
to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members . . . the last 
murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution 
was carried out.50  
I shall assume a less absolute yet still strong interpretation of 
retributivism: that wrongdoers should receive the punishment they deserve 
unless there are strong countervailing reasons why they should not. 
  
 
 
 49. But some call this view “negative retributivism.” See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/. 
Others call it “modest retributivism.” See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 
ETHICS 542 (1991). 
 50. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right, in THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1780). 
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V. THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE RETRIBUTIVIST ARGUMENT 
In this section I consider three possible responses to the retributivist 
argument for LWOP.  
A. No wrongdoers deserve LWOP, because no wrongdoers deserve any 
punishment. Although some wrongdoers must be confined against their 
will because they pose a danger to society, this is not punishment, i.e., the 
intentional infliction of suffering as a response to wrongdoing. This view 
constitutes a wholesale rejection of retributivism. 
B. Some wrongdoers deserve LWOP, but because it is inhumane, 
uncivilized, or otherwise unacceptable we should not impose it and should 
impose a lesser punishment instead. In this case, a lesser punishment than 
LWOP is justified not by the offender’s desert but by other moral 
considerations such as the prohibition on cruelty or inhumanity. 
C. No wrongdoers deserve LWOP, although they deserve some lesser 
punishment. A lesser punishment than LWOP is justified by 
considerations of the offender’s desert. 
 
A. Should We Reject Retributivism? 
 
Consider the view that no wrongdoers deserve LWOP because no one 
deserves any punishment. It implies that even the suffering of a wrongdoer 
imposed as punishment is an intrinsic evil that can be justified only as a 
means to some greater good. This is a view typically associated with 
consequentialism, although one can hold it without being a 
consequentialist. 
Evaluating this view is not easy, in part because it’s difficult to identify 
the nature and purpose of suffering a wrongdoer might undergo while 
being punished. Suppose you believe that an essential aim of punishment 
is rehabilitation, including moral education. You might well think that 
suffering is required for moral education to take place—that no one could 
be rehabilitated in the desired sense unless they suffered, at some point at 
least, in recognition of the wrongs they had committed. In that case, the 
wrongdoer’s suffering would be a necessary element in punishment. But it 
would not be intrinsically desirable in the way a retributivist believes it is; 
rather, suffering would be an empirically necessary precondition for 
rehabilitation. We can test our intuitions about this matter by imagining a 
person who by taking a pill not only becomes harmless, but also genuinely 
appreciates the immorality of their criminal acts. Yet their understanding 
is intellectual, not emotional, and so they do not suffer as a result—for that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
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is how the pill works.51 Is this enough? If you think not, then it appears 
you believe suffering is an intrinsic and not simply an instrumental good. 
The problem is that it’s difficult to imagine how someone could 
recognize the wrongness of what they had done intellectually without at 
the same time suffering in so recognizing it; if they didn’t suffer, we 
would have good reason to doubt that genuine recognition had taken place. 
In that case, suffering, although not intrinsically good, would be an 
essential part of coming to believe you have done wrong. 
In any case, it is best not to rest the argument against LWOP on a 
wholesale rejection of retributivism, because retributivism and anti-
retributivism seem to be foundational positions impossible to establish or 
disestablish, and because many people have strong retributivist intuitions. 
One is reminded of the philosopher John Wisdom’s discussion, in his 
classic paper “Gods,” of the two people who “return to their long 
neglected garden and find among the weeds a few of the old plants 
surprisingly vigorous.”52 One sees evidence of order and the work of a 
gardener, the other of disorder and neglect. After further examination, 
research, and discussion, neither person’s view has changed. At this point, 
Wisdom argues, when one says  
“I still think a gardener comes” and the other says “I don’t,” their 
different words now reflect no difference as to what they have 
found in the garden, no difference as to what they would find in the 
garden if they looked further and no difference about how fast 
untended gardens fall into disorder.53 
Of course this is just a way of saying that their disagreement is not 
empirical, and no one will be surprised that the differences between 
retributivists and nonretributivists do not rest primarily on disagreements 
about the facts. But Wisdom’s metaphor is salient. Consider two people 
responding to the crimes and trial of Dylann Roof. Roof has shown no 
remorse for the murders; in a white supremacist manifesto he wrote in 
prison, he said, “I would like to make it crystal clear I do not regret what I 
did. I am not sorry. I have not shed a tear for the innocent people I 
killed.”54 The jury found him guilty and in January 2017 he was sentenced 
to death. 
 
 
       51.   The anti-retributivist Victor Tadros argues that it is the wrongdoer’s recognition of 
wrongdoing, rather than his suffering, that we should aim to bring about. See Victor Tadros, 
Recognition and Choice and Against Desert, in THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 41–87 (2011). 
       52. John Wisdom, Gods, 45 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 185, 191 (1944-1945). 
       53.   Id. at 192. 
  54. Alan Blinder & Kevin Sack, Dylann Roof, Addressing Court, Offers No Apology or 
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To many people, Roof personifies evil. He killed nine innocent people; 
they were in a church, at a Bible study meeting; he had spent time with the 
victims and talked with them; his acts were motivated by racial hatred; 
they were premeditated; he showed no remorse. He appears to be the 
poster child for the harshest punishment our system permits. Probably the 
only thing that can be said in his favor is that he neither denies nor makes 
excuses for having intentionally carried out these acts.55 
Others, however—although no less appalled by Roof’s actions—may 
see him differently. He’s pathetic, to be pitied rather than hated. We would 
not want to be him. We do not think of him as someone who has taken 
advantage of the rules to do what others would do if they were less fair-
minded.56 Even if we reject a simple view of criminality as disease in need 
of treatment rather than punishment, it is hard to avoid the thought that his 
soul is disordered (even if you are not in the habit of talking about 
people’s souls). This may be called a Platonic conception of crime and 
punishment, even if we are not prepared to follow Plato all the way to the 
conclusion that wrongdoing is simply (or not so simply) a form of 
ignorance. But we might agree with Plato that we should never harm any 
person, even if they have harmed us.57  Punishment of someone like 
Dylann Roof may seem to those drawn to this perspective beside the point.  
Let me consider three responses that might be made to this way of 
contrasting the two pictures. 
First, one might argue that the two pictures are not truly incompatible. 
Those who regard some violent wrongdoers as personifying evil may 
agree that their souls are disordered. However, there is an essential 
difference between one who adopts the first picture and one who adopts 
the second. It lies in the attitude they take toward the wrongdoer, more 
specifically whether or not they think it is intrinsically good that the 
wrongdoer suffer. This is, of course, precisely the disagreement between 
 
 
Explanation for Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 4, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/us/dylann-roof-
sentencing.html?action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArt
icle&pgtype=article&_r=0. 
 55. At the same time, proudly avowing one’s intention to murder innocent people and spark a 
race war is not exactly a mark in someone’s favor.  
 56. This is the argument for punishment from fair play, usually considered a retributivist 
argument, according to which the wrongdoer has taken advantage of the system and therefore should 
be punished. This argument is implausible when it comes to violent crime, although it makes sense in 
some realms, such as paying one’s taxes. Jean Hampton notes the limits of the fair play argument in 
Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND 
MERCY 114–16 (1988). 
 57. “It is never just to harm anyone,” Socrates says in the Republic after an exchange in which 
Polemarchus asserts it is just to treat one’s friends well and to harm one’s enemies. PLATO, REPUBLIC 
bk. I, at 335e (G.M.A. Grube trans., C.D.C. Reeve rev., Hackett Pub. Co., Inc. 2d ed. 1992) (c. 380 
B.C.). 
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retributivists and their opponents. The retributivist does not think the 
wrongdoer is pitiable or pathetic insofar as that implies we should not 
cause him suffering for its own sake. 
Second, one might argue that even if the picture of wrongdoers as 
pitiable rather than evil fits people like Roof, it is inadequate to the Hitlers 
and Stalins of the world. Is that because of the magnitude of their evil 
deeds? Or that Hitler and Stalin committed heinous crimes against 
millions of people continually throughout their lives, while Roof 
committed a crime on one day while still young and immature? Certainly, 
some people will want to distinguish wrongdoers along these lines and 
reserve their strongest retributive impulses only for the worst of the worst, 
perhaps relegating the Roofs of the world to a lesser circle of hell. But the 
question is whether anyone belongs in the first circle.  
These two objections reinforce Wisdom’s view that the disagreement 
we encounter here is close to bedrock, representing attitudes that are 
highly resistant to changes of mind or heart. Two people may look at the 
same set of facts and have radically different moral responses that cannot 
be rationally adjudicated. 
Finally, the idea that the wrongdoer is pitiable or pathetic might not 
seem to fit with the conception of human dignity on which the European 
Court of Human Rights rests its rejection of the death penalty and 
LWOP.58 Perhaps “pitiable” and “pathetic” are not the right terms; 
nevertheless, dignity is not what comes to mind. 
There is much controversy about the meaning and role of the concept 
of dignity in discussions of human rights—with some asserting that it’s 
“nothing but a phrase.”59 Here it is perhaps enough to note that in this 
context, dignity is a normative rather than a descriptive concept. It tells us 
that we ought to treat people a certain way, not that they are a certain way. 
We should treat people with dignity, but that doesn’t mean they always 
behave with dignity.  
 
B. Overriding Retributivism 
 
Resting the argument against LWOP on a wholesale rejection of 
retributivism, then, would fail to touch many seemingly reasonable people 
with some retributive ground-beliefs. Consider next the argument that 
 
 
 58. See Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III-Eur. Ct. H.R 317. “[I]t would be incompatible with 
the provision on human dignity in the Basic Law for the State forcefully to deprive a person of his 
freedom without at least providing him with the chance to someday regain that freedom.” Id. at §113. 
 59. See Charles R. Beitz, Human Dignity in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing But a 
Phrase?, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (2013). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:1 
 
 
56 
some wrongdoers deserve LWOP, but because it is inhumane, uncivilized, 
or otherwise unacceptable we should not impose it. This is Jeffrey 
Reiman’s reason for rejecting the death penalty: “[p]ublicly refusing to do 
horrible things to our fellows . . . signals the level of our civilization and . . 
. continues the work of civilizing.”60 The death penalty is horrible, he 
believes, because of the intense pain (psychological if not physical) 
accompanying it and “the spectacle of one human being completely 
subject to the power of another.”61 Unless the death penalty has significant 
marginal deterrent value (which Reiman doubts, for good reason), it lies 
beyond the realm of acceptable punishments.62 Reiman thus rejects Kant’s 
claim that a wrongdoer’s desert is the only consideration relevant to 
deciding their punishment.  
Reiman’s view that some wrongdoers deserve to die makes his 
argument highly attractive in certain ways. It allows one to reject the death 
penalty without seeming to soft-pedal criminal acts. But can Reiman’s 
approach delegitimize the death penalty without doing the same for 
LWOP? Does locking someone up for the rest of his life with no prospect 
of release cause less intense psychological pain than killing him? The six 
Alabama defendants charged with capital crimes who chose death over 
LWOP clearly thought not.63 And they are not alone. 
Indeed, it’s not obvious that Reiman’s approach even clearly 
delegitimizes the death penalty. It might be wrong to torture the torturer 
and rape the rapist but still be acceptable to kill the killer. So in the end the 
strategy of claiming a punishment to be “deserved, but uncivilized” may 
not be helpful in deciding whether sentences such as death and LWOP are 
morally permissible; it might seem to beg the question.  
For similar reasons, the considerations suggesting that a punishment is 
deserved but uncivilized might equally warrant the conclusion that it is in 
fact undeserved. Indeed, it becomes hard to tell the difference between 
these claims. That brings us to the third response to the retributivist 
argument for LWOP: that wrongdoers deserve to be punished, but not with 
LWOP.  
  
 
 
       60.   Reiman, supra note 47, at 136 (emphasis in original). And “from the fact that something is 
justly deserved, it does not automatically follow that it should be done, since there may be other moral 
reasons for not doing it such that, all told, the weight of moral reasons swings the balance against 
proceeding” Id. at 134. 
 61. Id. at 140.  
 62. Id. at 138. 
 63. See Bryan Stevenson, director of the Equal Justice Initiative, discussed in Liptak, supra note 
27. It’s also true, however, that most people on death row fight hard to get their sentences converted to 
life. But it’s unclear whether that’s because they prefer living a long life in prison to death or because a 
life sentence still leaves the door open for eventual release, either because of a liberalizing of 
sentencing practices or the introduction of new evidence or some other exculpatory matter. 
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C. A Moderate Retributivism 
I have argued that of the standard justifications for punishment, only 
retributivism can hope to justify LWOP. But without the implausible 
assumption that retributivism requires punishment equal or proportional to 
the crime, irrespective of any other considerations, retributivism neither 
entails nor even suggests that some people should remain in prison for life. 
Thus, the link between retributivism and LWOP is severable and 
contingent: justice does not require LWOP. In the remainder of this paper, 
I argue that even retributivists should reject it. 
Proponents of LWOP believe some offenders should never be released 
from prison no matter what they do or how they change. Two kinds of 
change are significant. One is the change from being dangerous to being 
not dangerous. Nonretributivists think that when the (forward-looking) 
justifications for punishment are not met offenders should be released. If 
we agree that LWOP does not serve the purposes of general deterrence or 
rehabilitation, in practice this means that offenders who are no longer 
dangerous should be released.64  
It might be said that any risk, no matter how small, posed by someone 
who has committed a violent crime is sufficient to warrant their continued 
incarceration. That person, after all, is guilty, and should bear the burden 
as against innocent people. But this is an unacceptably rigorous standard. 
Absolute certainty is unattainable in any predictive enterprise. There are 
costs to not releasing a person too—not only monetary costs and costs to 
the offender, but also in many cases to his family, loved ones, and 
community. Presumably these latter people are also innocent in the 
relevant sense. And the requirement of certainty could allow us to lock up 
just about anybody at any time, in the absence of any criminal behavior 
whatsoever.  
Opponents of LWOP may demand evidence of repentance and change 
of heart before a wrongdoer is released, even when the wrongdoer is 
believed to pose no danger and has been incarcerated long enough to serve 
the purpose of general deterrence. This may be the most plausible view, 
and I will take it as my starting point.  
Nondangerousness and repentance are logically distinct, even though 
the second often suggests the first. Presumably, one who sincerely regrets 
his wrongdoing is less likely to pose a danger than one who does not. But 
some who commit violence—such as domestic abusers—may regret their 
 
 
       64.   Recall that even Norway, whose maximum sentence is twenty-one years, permits judges to 
extend sentences in five-year increments to dangerous offenders. See Goldstein, supra note 23, at 18. 
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acts even though they may act violently again. And, on the other hand, 
ceasing to be dangerous may result from physical inability and does not 
necessarily reflect repentance. 
So here is the view I defend:  
Those who commit the worst crimes (and are morally responsible for 
committing them, i.e. are not legally insane or otherwise excused from 
punishment) deserve punishment and ought to be punished, but those who 
are no longer dangerous and have undergone a change of heart amounting 
to repentance must be evaluated for release after serving a reasonable and 
appropriate sentence that satisfies aims of punishment such as deterrence 
and respect for law and persons. 
VI. POSITIVE ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLISHING LWOP 
In the remainder of this article, I offer positive arguments for 
abolishing LWOP. Together with the arguments already adduced, I think 
they add up to an overwhelming case that LWOP should be abolished. 
The considerations that follow divide into three groups. The first 
focuses on offenders’ culpability and mitigating circumstances that might 
reduce it. The second concerns the beneficial consequences of abolishing 
LWOP and the personal and institutional virtues it reinforces. The third 
considers the rationality, or lack of it, of punishing people who are 
importantly different from those who committed the crimes for which we 
are punishing them.  
 
A. Mitigated Responsibility 
 
Even if LWOP is not absolutely wrong, it’s clear that of the nearly 
50,000 LWOP prisoners and the more than 100,000 prisoners serving life 
sentences, many of which are de facto LWOP, the overwhelming majority 
should eventually be released. Many are serving sentences that are 
excessive by any reasonable standard. There are 10,000 lifers convicted of 
nonviolent offenses,65 and 10,000 lifers convicted of crimes committed 
before they were eighteen years old (of whom nearly one in four is 
sentenced to LWOP).66 There are many others too who have committed 
violent crimes but whose sentences should be tempered because of mental 
illness, drug addiction, and other mitigating circumstances.  
Most defenders of LWOP are, I believe, focused on a relatively small 
number of prisoners who they think should never be released. Why isn’t it 
 
 
 65. Nellis, supra note 6, at 1.  
       66.   Id. at 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018]                              AGAINST LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE               
 
 
 
59 
enough, then, if opponents of LWOP concede that most prisoners should 
have a chance to return to society? It would certainly be an improvement. 
Compared to the harsh and unjust punishment suffered by many of these 
150,000 prisoners, LWOP for a much smaller number would be major 
progress. After all, the revocation of each and every unjust LWOP 
sentence would give one person some of his life back. 
The argument for the wholesale abolition of LWOP rests partly on the 
view that as long as the sentences offenders endure do not trivialize the 
gravity of their crimes, respect for persons and their agency means leaving 
open the possibility that offenders can be morally rehabilitated and 
undergo significant change. (I will say more about this shortly.) It may 
seem laughable to think that people like Anders Breivik and Dylann Roof 
(not to mention Hitler and Stalin) might change, but that’s irrelevant. It’s 
the principle that if they did they should be considered for release. 
Now of course adamant defenders of LWOP will disagree, asserting 
that only a life sentence (or death) is appropriate for such people. Either 
they reject the argument that the meaning or expressive function of 
sentences is partly relative, or they simply reassert the well-worn phrase 
that LWOP (or death) is what these people deserve.  
There is a hint of a paradox in the reasoning of those who defend 
LWOP for “the worst of the worst.” It suggests that people like Breivik 
and Roof are evil through and through. Is it, then, that such people cannot 
change, or that they will not? If the latter, so be it; they should remain 
locked up. If the former, we come up against grave questions about free 
will and responsibility that threaten the very idea of punishment. 
I have so far avoided such questions. It may be suspected that many 
who reject retributivism as a matter of principle do so partly because they 
doubt the existence of free will and thus genuine moral responsibility. 
Although such doubts are not necessary conditions for rejecting 
retributivism, they are, it seems clear, sufficient. You cannot believe 
people deserve to suffer unless you think they are morally responsible for 
the acts that have rendered them deserving of suffering. The case of 
psychopaths is instructive. They do not fit the usual criteria for mental 
illness or legal insanity, which would excuse them from punishment 
(although not from involuntary incarceration). But how did they get the 
way they are? If they were either born or made by their environments to 
have the characteristics that render them indifferent to others’ suffering, on 
what moral basis can we punish them? Similar arguments could be made 
about wrongdoers who are not psychopaths. Many, perhaps most, of those 
incarcerated for life have experienced conditions (whether due to nature or 
nurture or both) that have contributed to their committing crimes, such that 
if they had not experienced these conditions they would not have 
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committed those crimes. Isn’t that relevant to determining how much 
punishment they deserve? But if it is, how do we avoid falling down the 
slippery slope to the conclusion that no one is ever morally responsible for 
their actions and thus no one can ever justly be punished? 
Here is one way to avoid the slippery slope. We do it by compromising 
between two powerful, intuitive perspectives neither of which we can 
abandon entirely. One is that, practically and humanly, we must hold 
people responsible for their actions most of the time. We cannot think of 
ourselves or, usually, others as beings whose behavior is the inevitable 
outcome of everything that happened to them before.67 This is the lesson 
of (or perhaps the reason for) compatibilism, probably the dominant view 
of the free will problem among contemporary moral philosophers and 
criminal law theorists. Compatibilism says that determinism (universal 
causation) and free will or moral responsibility are compatible—that if 
one’s actions are caused in the right way or by the right things (and 
different theories will offer different accounts of what the right way or the 
right things are), then we are morally responsible for them; our wills are 
for the most part as free as they need to be. After all, the compatibilist 
rightly points out, if our actions were not caused they would be uncaused, 
i.e. random, and that would hardly make them free. Although I am as 
much of a compatibilist as the next moral philosopher, the view is 
satisfying as long as you don’t push on it, which we can often avoid doing. 
But the principle and its upshots clash with another, equally indispensable 
principle—that the freedom to choose one’s actions is essential to 
determining what a person deserves—along with the recognition that 
many of the factors that contribute to a person’s committing crimes have 
severely limited their freedom. 
We know that growing up in environments with certain kinds of 
deprivations—such as high poverty, poor schools, easy access to guns and 
drugs, non-intact families, inadequate access to decent employment—
greatly increases the likelihood that people will go on to commit violent 
crimes. For example, the probability that if you live in the city of 
Baltimore you will commit a violent crime is more than five times greater 
than for residents of the United States as a whole. This comparison 
significantly understates the effect, since the figures for the US as a whole 
include many places with high crime rates and thus obscure the contrast 
with safer places. For example, Baltimore’s rate of violent crime is more 
than thirty times that of Frederick, Maryland, a small city about an hour 
 
 
 67. An important and nearly universally acclaimed source of this view is P.F. Strawson, Freedom 
and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962); reprinted IN P. F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND 
RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS (Routledge 2008) (1974). 
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west of Baltimore.68 It seems altogether unjust to ignore such disparities in 
judging what offenders deserve. 
The way to square this circle is to punish, but to punish less harshly 
than we would if a more robust conception of free will were in play.69 
From a purely logical point of view, this solution may appear wholly 
inadequate. It wants to have it both ways, and must distort each of the two 
principles under consideration. But the compromise, I believe, does as 
much justice as we can hope to find in this world.  
B. The Benefits of Abolishing LWOP 
Another reason to abolish LWOP and other extremely long sentences is 
simply that doing so will likely have good consequences. Consider first 
the prisoners whose sentences would be shortened. I shall assume that they 
would be better off than if they remained incarcerated. That’s not quite as 
obvious as it might seem, since formerly incarcerated people can find it 
very difficult to secure a decent life on the outside in the absence of 
education, training, and money—which they so often lack. Any rational 
criminal justice system must put mitigating these disadvantages at the 
center of its approach. Nonetheless, I assume that even in the absence of 
such changes formerly incarcerated people will be better off out of prison 
than in it. One piece of evidence is that most of them fervently want to get 
out. 
  
 
 
 68. I have calculated these comparisons based on rates of violent crime as reported in Table 6 of 
the FBI’s 2017 Statistics on Crime in the United States. See FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING 
PROGRAM, VIOLENT CRIME (2017),  https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2017/topic-pages/tables/table-6. On hearing such facts, we typically think of the increased probability 
if you live in a high-crime area of being the victim of a crime. But equally significant is the far greater 
chance of being a perpetrator. 
 A further reason to doubt the legitimacy of bringing the full force of the law down on these 
offenders is that the state and society in question are often complicit, at the very least, with these 
criminogenic conditions, and this may invalidate their right to punish, or to punish beyond a certain 
point. For discussion of this increasingly popular view see, e.g., ERIN KELLY, THE LIMITS OF BLAME: 
RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 149–77 (2018); Victor Tadros, Poverty and Criminal 
Responsibility, 43 J. VALUE INQUIRY 391 (2009); Gary Watson, A Moral Predicament in the Criminal 
Law, 58 INQUIRY 168 (2015); Tommie Shelby, Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto, 35 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 126 (2007); Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217–43 (1973).  
       69.   Part of the problem is that it’s hard to imagine what a robust conception of free will could be. 
If the only alternative to an event or action’s being caused is its being uncaused, we don’t have a 
solution, because randomness is not freedom. This is, of course, one of the appeals of compatibilism. It 
reasons that if uncaused actions would not be free, then perhaps caused actions are not necessarily 
unfree, because otherwise freedom would be logically impossible. So we must mean something by 
freedom that is not incompatible with causation, i.e. causal determinism. For a good survey of 
compatibilism and its varieties, see Michael McKenna & D. Justin Coates, Compatibilism, STANFORD 
ENCYC. PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2015,) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. 
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What about the effects of abolition on society more generally? The 
waste of human lives condemned to prison for life, or even for decades, is 
tragic as well as irrational, and can be justified only by some powerful 
offsetting benefits. As we have seen, there is scant evidence that long 
sentences have either general or special deterrent value. Incarceration is 
very expensive, and becomes more so as prisoners age.70  
Of course, in considering the benefits of LWOP, we cannot ignore the 
interests of victims. Some victims want offenders to receive the maximum 
penalties possible and may otherwise feel unhappy or insecure. But not all 
victims do; some reject the idea that because one life has been lost others 
must be as well.71  
But just as important are the families and communities of those who 
have committed crimes, who are also victims. The harms of having their 
members—especially men and, disproportionately, young black men—
disappear from the community for years at a time are incalculable, even 
taking account of the benefits of having violent people taken away.72  It’s 
hard to know how to weigh these harms against any benefits of very long 
sentences to direct crime victims and their loved ones. But I doubt that in 
this comparison the benefits of lengthy sentences, including LWOP, 
outweigh their costs.   
Also relevant are the benefits to those who adopt a less vindictive 
approach. If such policies result from democratic decision-making, that 
includes “us” as a society, in addition to individual agents of reintegration. 
To embrace this approach is to express a certain optimism about the 
possibilities of good and redemption in human beings, and those attitudes 
may benefit those who hold them.  
Ryan Preston-Roedder has explored this terrain in his insightful essay 
“Faith in Humanity,” arguing that “having a certain form of faith in 
people’s decency . . . is a centrally important moral virtue.”73 Faith in 
 
 
 70. See Goldstein, supra note 23, at 3. The reader may notice that much of what I argue in this 
paper—although not everything—applies to life with parole and other decades-long sentences, not 
only to life without parole. 
 71. There are many examples, including the families of Dylann Roof’s victims, who forgave 
perpetrators of violence on their loved ones. See also the Radiolab story Dear Hector, NEW YORK 
PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.radiolab.org/story/317629-dear-hector/.  But to forgive 
does not necessarily entail advocating shortening a person’s sentence, so it can be difficult to identify 
instances where the two go together. 
 72. See, e.g., Robert D. Crutchfield & Gregory A. Weeks, The Effects of Mass Incarceration on 
Communities of Color, 32 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. (Fall 2015), https://issues.org/the-effects-of-mass-
incarceration-on-communities-of-color/; Katy Reckdahl, Mass Incarceration’s Collateral Damage: 
The Children Left Behind, THE NATION (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/mass-
incarcerations-collateral-damage-children-left-behind/; IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS 
OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Patillo, Bruce Western, & David Weiman, eds., 2006). 
       73.   Ryan Preston-Roedder, Faith in Humanity, 87 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 664–65 
(2013). 
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humanity must not be confused with naïveté; optimism can be risky. But, 
as Preston-Roedder notes, all moral virtues carry risks, and it’s possible to 
exhibit the virtue while taking the risks responsibly.  
Faith in humanity, according to Preston-Roedder, makes the world 
better both for those who have faith and for those in whom they have faith. 
Take first the idea that it is good for those in whom one has faith. Viktor 
Frankl, psychotherapist and Auschwitz survivor, proclaimed that “if we 
treat people as if they were what they ought to be, we help them become 
what they are capable of becoming.”74 It sounds nice, of course. But there 
is good social-scientific evidence confirming this view—showing, for 
example, that people tend to internalize others’ view of them, and that 
when people have certain expectations of others’ behavior they may send 
subtle signals to which those others then conform.75 For these and other 
reasons, “having faith in people’s decency tends to encourage them to act 
rightly.”76 It’s not foolproof; we can make mistakes, and we can 
sometimes be taken in by clever actors. Blind trust is not advisable. But an 
attitude that does not reduce people to their worst acts, as Bryan Stevenson 
puts it, and that does not permanently label them as criminals is more 
likely to succeed.77 It is also very much in keeping with religious teachings 
many people hold dear.  
Is faith in humanity good only because of its presumed effects on those 
in whom one has faith? Preston-Roedder argues that it is also good for 
those who have faith. Some may think his reasons beg the question. He 
believes those with faith in humanity not only will encourage people to act 
well but are more likely to treat others justly and to enter “into an 
important form of community with them.”78 Those who support LWOP 
think that it is just treatment for people who have committed violent 
crimes, and they may argue that entering into community with them is not 
desirable.  
But faith in humanity can be good for those who have it even apart 
 
 
 74. VIKTOR FRANKL, THE DOCTOR AND THE SOUL: FROM PSYCHOTHERAPY TO LOGOTHERAPY 8 
(Richard Winston & Clara Winston trans., 3d ed. 1986), quoted in Preston-Roedder, supra note 73, at 
664. 
 75. See Preston-Roedder, supra note 73, at 676. The well-known phenomena at work include the 
self-fulfilling prophecy, a now-ubiquitous term coined by Robert Merton in The Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. (1948), and stereotype threat, where lower expectations of African 
Americans or women produce lower results on tests. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, 
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995); Claude Steele, Thin Ice: Stereotype Threat and Black College Students, 
THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 1999), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/08/thin-ice-
stereotype-threat-and-black-college-students/304663/. 
 76. Preston-Roedder, supra note 73, at 676. 
 77. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 15–18 (2015). 
 78. Preston-Roedder, supra note 73, at 687. 
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from its effects on others. To be hopeful and optimistic is good for one’s 
own well-being.79 That alone is not sufficient to recommend it. But we can 
count this trait as a virtue if we agree that having it is on balance good for 
those who possess it and for others. A world in which we do not give up 
on people who have done terrible things, and where we aim to facilitate 
their journey to a different place, is a better world than the alternative. 
 
C. Punishment and Personal Identity 
 
A final reason to abolish LWOP has to do with the strangeness of 
continuing to punish a person who committed a crime years earlier but 
may have changed radically since then. This is the situation of many 
people serving extremely long sentences. They may have committed 
murder—or something less serious—when they were teenagers, and are 
still serving life sentences thirty to sixty years later. Leaving aside the 
moral legitimacy of continued punishment, we may question its 
rationality. What is the point of punishing a person who recognizes the 
wrongness of what he has done, who no longer identifies with those acts, 
and who bears little resemblance to the person he was so many years 
earlier? It’s tempting to say he is no longer the same person.       
That judgment might appear to land us into dense philosophical 
thickets. But is it really so complicated? To say that the prisoner is in one 
sense the same person he was at seventeen, and in another sense not, may 
seem unsatisfying—but it seems pretty accurate, and conforms to ways we 
commonly talk. As Jennifer Lackey argues, because we take mental states 
to be relevant to punishment, we should also take two stages of the same 
person “with radically different attitudes toward his crime, as deserving of 
different punishments. . . . Current selves and future selves can vary from 
one another no less than two altogether distinct people do.”80 
These considerations may seem abstract. For them to become concrete 
and palpable, it helps to become acquainted, many years after their crimes, 
with people who have been incarcerated from a young age. Doing so can 
cause you to ask whether it makes any sense to continue to punish these 
people to the end of their lives. From my experience, the answer is no. 
  
 
 
 79. See, e.g., Ciro Conversano et al., Optimism and Its Impact on Mental and Physical Well-
Being, 6 CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEMIOLOGY MENTAL HEALTH 25 (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2894461/, and references therein. 
 80. Jennifer Lackey, The Irrationality of Natural Life Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/the-irrationality-of-natural-life-sentences/. Lackey 
argues that it is irrational to ignore such information in sentencing decisions. It’s only irrational, 
however, if there are no good moral reasons for ignoring it. I have tried to show here that there are no 
good moral reasons. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss1/6
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 I have argued that we have many good reasons to abolish life-without 
parole-sentences, and no good reasons not to. The only rationale for 
punishment that can hope to justify LWOP is a retributive one. Even if 
retributivism is a sound principle, however, it does not obviously support 
LWOP. One reason is that unless one accepts a view like Kant’s that 
appropriate punishments must be carried out whatever the circumstances, 
we must acknowledge that other considerations are relevant to determining 
punishments. Thus, even if someone deserves a certain punishment it does 
not follow that they should get it; some punishments, like torturing the 
torturer or raping the rapist, are too ghastly to be imposed. Furthermore, 
retributivism does not dictate particular punishments, so the question 
remains which are reasonable and appropriate. Tempering sentences need 
not trivialize the gravity of the crimes to which they respond, because the 
expressive meaning of sentences is partly relative—to other sentences and 
to cultural norms, which are malleable.   
These arguments show that we need not reject retributivism to reject 
LWOP: justice does not demand it. But showing why LWOP is wrong also 
requires making a positive case for abolition. I have offered several 
reasons for this conclusion. First, few people are fully culpable for their 
criminal acts, and so we should mitigate their punishment accordingly. 
Second, abolishing LWOP—and indeed all life sentences—is likely to 
bring many benefits, to prisoners, their loved ones, the community, and to 
those who decide for abolition and who carry it out. Finally, it is pointless 
to continue to punish a person who has undergone changes of character 
that distance him greatly from the person who committed the crime many 
decades earlier.  
Life-without-parole sentences should be abolished. But abolition alone 
will not suffice; parole must become a more realistic possibility than it is 
now. That, however, is another subject. 
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